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During the air battles in the Middle East from 1982 to 1985. MiG-23 destroyed 12 enemy aircraft (including at least five F-16s and three F-15s according to Russian/Syrian authors), with their losses of 11-13 aircraft. Not such a bad balance, given that the majority of the "twenty-third" were far from the most recent modifications, and they were opposed by the most modern at that time American fourth-generation fighters, in the cockpits of which there were pilots who had, perhaps, the world's best professional training. In battles over Lebanon, both the strengths and weaknesses of the MiG-23 were demonstrated. The first included high speed and accelerating characteristics, which made it possible to carry out a rapid attack and leave the battle at high speed (according to some Western experts, the MiG-23 was able to successfully attack and leave the attack when meeting with any other fighter). The MiG also had certain chances of winning and the ability to perform relatively long high-speed flights at low altitude with the wing set to the maximum sweep position: the F-15 and F-16 with a low specific load on the wing experienced too much shaking near the ground, and such a ride cobblestone pavement "could not withstand even well-trained pilots.
At the same time, the MiG-23 was slightly inferior to the F-15 in both maximum and minimum speeds (however, the superiority of the Eagle in speed was rather theoretical: in practice, the 2.5 Mach flight capability of the F-15 was only in the flight manual since could not exceed Mach 2,3). The weakness of the "twenty-third" was the worst horizontal maneuverability compared to the latest American fighters. Up to a speed of 1200 km / h, the MiG-23 had a smaller available overload than the F-15, and therefore lower angular turn rate speeds, as well as a longer turn time (losing the MiG in the steady angular turn rate speed at a speed of 900 km / h was for various heights 2-6 deg/ s). However, at speeds above 1200 km / h, the advantage gradually passed to the MiG. The MiG-23 was slightly inferior to the American fighter in acceleration characteristics with a sweep angle of 45 ° and maneuvering with overloads close to the limit. This allowed the F-15 during the battle to gradually accumulate superiority in energy (in speed and height). The required input speed of the MiG-23 in the vertical maneuver was also slightly higher than that of the F-15. The maximum insertion height into the Nesterov loop for the MiG was 4000 m, and for the F-15 - 7000 m, while at the top of the vertical maneuvers the MiG-23 had a lower speed than the Eagle.
The American radar system had certain advantages over the MiG-23MF radar. However, the capabilities of the improved MiG-23ML and F-15A were approximately equal. The AN / APG-63 radar mounted on the Eagle was able to detect the MiG-23 at a maximum range of 100-110 km (with a heading angle of 90 degrees), and the MiG-23ML "saw" the enemy under the same conditions at a distance of 90 -95 km. The radars of both aircraft had the ability to detect targets against the background of the ground. Although the AN / APG-63 viewing area in azimuth was twice the viewing area of the RP-23 (+/- 60 and +/- 30 degrees, respectively), the resolution in angular coordinates of the Soviet station was 1.5 times better than that of American, which allowed, in particular, to hide from the enemy the true number of aircraft flying in tight formation.
Theoretically, if you compare published in the early 1980's. the characteristics of another fourth-generation American aircraft - the F-16A light fighter with real MiG-23 data, the superiority of the overseas machine over it in close combat (in terms of turn rate, acceleration, and vertical maneuvrability) should have been even more impressive than that of F-15A. However, the results of the battles over the Bekaa Valley did not show such obvious advantages of the F-16A. Moreover, it turned out that in a number of indicators (in particular, acceleration characteristics), the latest modifications of the MiG-23 are not only not inferior, but also somewhat surpass the capabilities of the American machine.
The reason for this embarrassment was the discrepancy between the real capabilities of the F-16A and its advertising parameters that fell into all the aviation directories in the world. So, it was reported that the normal take-off weight of the F-16A (with two AIM-9 “Sidewinder”, without fuel tanks ) is a little more than 10 tons. With the declared afterburner thrust of the Pratt-Whitney F100-PW-200 engine at 11340 kgf this provided a thrust ratio of more than 1, 1 with a specific wing load of 370 kg / m2 (the corresponding parameters of the MiG-23MF were 0.8 and 440 kg / m2). In fact, the normal take-off weight of the F-16A delivered to Israel exceeded 11,000 kg, and the maximum thrust of the turbofan engine was only 10,800 kgf. At the same time, the Israelis immediately began to improve their fighters, which led to the inevitable increase in weight. As a result, the take-off thrust-weight ratio of the F-16A was slightly more than 0.9, and the specific wing load was 430 kg / m2, that is, the American aircraft almost “dropped” to the level of the MiG-23MF and almost equaled the lighter MiG-23ML.
It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the advertising games that created the F-16 General Dynamics, McDonnell-Douglas, the supplier of the F-15, always tried to provide fairly reliable information about its aircraft. Therefore, estimates of the Eagle`s combat capabilities made by aviation experts before the 1982 conflict were almost completely confirmed during the fighting. "McDonnell-Douglas" has shown good faith in providing information on the results of the combat use of its vehicles, reporting that in 1979-82. The Israeli Air Force F-15A shot down 56.5 Syrian fighters (one MiG-21 Eagle shared with Kfir). This is accurate to the plane consistent with the Syrian data. At the same time, the General Dynamics announced 45 victories of the F-16 were won, in the vast majority, only on paper. A certain tactical superiority was given by the F-15 and F-16 significantly better visibility from the cockpit (in one of the Western magazines the MiG-23 was called a "fighter with an overview as from an armored personnel carrier"). At the same time, the presence on the MiGs of the automatic command guidance system "Azure" (the analogue of which was not on the F-15 and F-16) could provide Syrian aviation with an advantage in organizing combat control. However, the ground equipment delivered from the USSR was not put into operation, in addition, the Syrians did not have a continuous radar field over Lebanon for its effective use. In addition, the Israelis at the beginning of hostilities managed to destroy the Syrian fighter control center deployed in Lebanon.
When in 1978 a political decision was made to once again demonstrate our combat aircraft (MiG-23 — for the first time outside the “socialist camp”) and our military pilots in capitalist countries, it turned out that even the “aerobatic” 234th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment from Kubinka was not able to show a group of six pilots prepared for flights on the MiG-23 in a short notification order! The problem was solved simply: the missing pilots and the engineering staff were taken from the "fraternal" 32nd Guards Regiment of the 9th Fighter Air Division, which was then based in Shatalovo, Smolensk Region.
In preparation for foreign visits, the 234th Air Regiment received about ten new MiG-23MLA aircraft. A distinctive feature of these machines was that they were dismantled not only the radar sight and the state recognition system, but also all the pylons (except for the central one for suspending the fuel tank), an infrared receiver and some instrumentation in the aircraft cabin.
MiG-23ML fighter released a parachute during landing on the runway of Kuopio-Rissala airbase. The Soviet fighter stopped after a run of 875 yards (800 m). The fuselage keel is rotated to the right during the approach, which began at a speed of 174 mph (280 km / h) (picture by Peter Steinemann)
MiG-23 fighters visited Reims, France in 1978... Six Russian MiG-23ML aircraft on the ground and in the cloudy sky!
This MiG-23MLA fighter released a parachute during landing on the runway of Kuopio-Rissala airbase. The Soviet fighter stopped after a run of 875 yards (800 m). The fuselage keel is rotated to the right during the approach, which began at a speed of 174 mph (280 km / h) (photo by Peter Steinemann)
Six Soviet MiG-23S fighters flew over Kuopio-Rissala airbase during August visit to Finland (photo by Peter Steinemann)
MiG-23MLA aircraft prepared for visits abroad (“visiting” aircraft) at the Rissala airbase, Finland.
August 1978 Photo by Jukka Huppunen, www.airliners.net
in August 1978, these MiG-23ML fighters were photographed by Peter Steinemann during a courtesy visit to Kuopio-Rissala airbase in Finland, under the command of Karjalan Lennosto air command. These aircraft, commanded by Lt. Col. E. Bihakov, belong to a squadron based in Kubinka 50 miles (80 km) west of Moscow. Apparently, before flying outside the Warsaw Pact countries, the vehicles were deprived of radar and navigation equipment.
Landing in a pair. "Visiting" MiG-23MLA 4 aer 234 giap, Kubinka airfield, early 1980s. Photo A.M. Jusa
The Soviet MiG-23s successfully fought with the French Mirages F1 in Angola in 1985. The Cuban "volunteers" flying on these aircraft managed to seize and hold dominance in the air until the exit from the war, both supported by the USSR, Luanda, managed to defeat South Africa in the air. Already in the 1990s, the remaining Angolan MiG-23MLD (1994) were successfully used by mercenaries from South Africa to restore the “constitutional order” in the country (again, as bombing attack aircraft).
The MiG-23M aircraft in the middle of 1974-75 almost simultaneously, entered service in the three fighter aviation divisions of the 16th Air Army in four regiments: the 31st Guards (Falkenberg), 35th (Zerbst), 85th Guards (Merseburg) and 787th IAP (Finov-Eberswalde). At that time, it was the most modern and difficult aircraft to operate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In 1974, the MiG-23M was received in the Merseburg and Falkenberg regiments of the 6th Guards group. The fighters arrived in Zerbst a year later already differed from them in the improved two-stage wheel turning mechanism MRK-30 (the pilots said: “To make it easy to steer through the forest”).
MiG-23M No. 55 in of the 412 IAP air defense (Dombarovka), 1985, after its repair that took place at the ARZ in N. Tagil. (ok.ru)
In march 1976 a solemn ceremony for the MiG-23M fighter aircraft was held, for the introduction into service with the air defense aviation. 401st air Regiment.
When used as a fighter, the MiG-23ML had significantly better combat effectiveness, having a modern complex of sighting equipment. The aiming system made it possible to intercept air targets in various situations: under difficult weather conditions, under radar jamming , as well as against the background of the ground, at head on and in the rear hemisphere attack courses. Unlike the “twenty-first”, the arsenal of which consisted only of melee missiles, the MiG-23 had a more powerful set of missile weapons and could conduct air combat using medium-range missiles R-23 and R-24 with a range of up to 35-50 km. The new missile weapons made it possible to hit enemy aircraft flying at higher or lower altitude relative to their fighter at ranges of 8000-10000 m, having high efficiency including when attacking highly maneuverable air targets (launching R-24 and R-60 missiles ensured the defeat of the enemy aircraft when it maneuvers with overload to the "eight Gs"). Since in the Afghan situation we had to deal with an air adversary only occasionally (such cases came down to episodic clashes with fighters from neighboring Iran and Pakistan), the strike capabilities of the aircraft for use on ground targets were primarily demanded. As a strike machine, the MiG-23 could carry up to 2000 kg of bombs with caliber from 50 to 500 kg on the underwing and ventral hard point pylons, including up to four "five hundred" and incendiary tanks or 16 hundred-kilogram bombs on the beams of multi-task pylons. The armament was supplemented by blocks of UB-16-57 and UB-32A unguided missiles canisters, equipped with only 96 S-5 missiles, or up to four S-24 large-caliber shells. However, the MiG-23 sighting system was still designed primarily for solving “fighter” tasks, and had limited capabilities when working on ground targets: for example, when bombing, firing a cannon and launching rockets, the sight was used as a conventional collimator sight, and the estimated dive angle and range were set manually.
The main types of ammunition used on the MiG-23 were air bombs, mainly high-explosive caliber 250 and 500 kg of various types and models, as well as high-explosive fragmentation OFAB-250-270 with a fragmentation "shirt", effective against most targets. The advantage of the OFAB was their versatility, which allowed them to hit both buildings that served as shelter for the enemy, strong points and defensive firing points, for which the power of a high-explosive strike was more than enough, as well as the manpower that was knocked out by a shower of deadly fragments. OFAB was most often used for equipping aircraft, and their share among other weapons was the largest. For rocky shelters, fortifications and caves, thick-walled FAB-250TS and FAB-500TS were used. Such bombs had a strong cast steel case, which ensured the penetration of barriers and stone vaults with a gap in the thickness of the shelter. For striking manpower in shelters, caves and duvalls and buildings in places where gangs and villages are based, voluminous-detonating ODAB-500P with liquid explosives were used, especially effective in mountain gorges, where the fiery cloud of their explosion retained impact power and temperature, burning large volumes.
A special effect was produced by single-shot bombs of a half-ton and a quarter-ton caliber - RBK-250, RBK-250-275 and RBK-500, starting with small fragmentation bombs, as well as ShOAB-0.5. Small fragmentation bombs were made of brittle steel cast iron, which easily burst into a mass of killer fragments when it burst. The most “meaningful” looked like halftone RBC-500 SHOAB-0.5 with small spherical bombs containing ready-made striking elements of hundreds of steel balls. The SHOAB cartridges contained 560-570 fragmentation bombs that fit literally in bulk into the cartridge case (which is why the quantity was called with some tolerance - how much did it fit). When dumping, the contents of the cassette were thrown out by a knockout charge, covering a space of up to several hectares (the action of RBC was described as "self-scattering").
The improvement of the MiG continued. Its design was gradually brought up, and the afterburning engine thrust was increased to 12300-12500 kgf. It should be noted that the best American serial fighter of the early 70's. F-4E "Phantom-2", being much heavier and more expensive than the Soviet car, was inferior to the MiG-23M in maneuverability and acceleration characteristics, rate of climb, maximum speed and ceiling. Together with the latest MiG-21bis fighter for gaining air superiority - in fact, a new aircraft with significantly improved performance characteristics, the MiG-23M provided the Russian Air Force with a qualitative superiority over the American fighter aircraft until the U.S. Air Force introduced into service in the second half of the 1970s, the fourth-generation F-15A and F-16A.
The main probable opponents of the MiG-23M in the 1970s were the American F-4E Phantom II fighter (McDonnell released 1,127 of them) and the French Mirage F-1. In combat with these formidable opponents, the MiG-23M pilot, depending on the conditions of air combat, could make full use of the positive qualities of an aircraft with variable wing geometry, which gave him the maximum possible superiority in maneuverability for each flight speed. So, when intercepting the enemy, as well as breaking away from him, the MiG-23M pilot could shift the wing to maximum sweep and switch to a supersonic mode, in which the MiG-23M had shorter acceleration time. The minimum sweep could be used in battle at flight speeds of less than 700-800 km / h, especially in vertical maneuvers. In almost the entire range of altitudes at speeds of 700-1100 km / h, the MiG-23M was superior to the Mirage F-1 in maneuverability and rate of climb. At speeds of more than 1100 km / h at medium and high altitudes, it was not profitable for the MiG-23M pilot to fight with the Mirage on established turns. The existing superiority of the MiG in climbing was expediently used to transfer the battle to ascending vertical maneuvers with small overloads, which would lead to a decrease in speed and translate the battle into conditions where the MiG-23 was superior to the Mirage F-1.
When conducting air combat with the F-4E at speeds of 800-1100 km / h at low and medium altitudes with overloads close to the ultimate in thrust, the MiG-23M in horizontal maneuver surpassed the enemy, yielding him in a vertical maneuver. The superiority of the MiG-23M over the F-4E (the most massive aircraft of the Israeli Air Force) is indirectly confirmed by the fact that since the second half of the 1970s, since the appearance of the MiG-23 in the Middle East, the Israeli Air Force stopped using Phantoms to conduct air battles. Comparing the capabilities of combat aircraft, it is very important to evaluate their aiming systems and weapons. It is no exaggeration to note that the aiming system of the MiG-23M fighter was not inferior to the sighting systems of the F-4E fighter (AN / APQ-120 radar, AN / ASG-26 optical sight) and the Mirage F-1 (Cyrano IV, CSF-196 riflescope), and in some respects significantly exceeded them. The AN / APQ-120 radar, in comparison with the French and Soviet radars, did not have a target detection mode against the ground, It was also less noise immune. The presence of a heat direction finder on the MiG-23M significantly expanded its combat capabilities and allowed it to successfully carry out combat missions even in conditions of powerful electronic countermeasures. The detection range of the TP-23 of an F-4 from the rear hemisphere in simple weather conditions was about 20 km. The guided missile R-23R surpassed in its capabilities the AIM-7B Sparrow and Matra R.530 missiles with the radar seeker, but they were somewhat inferior to the F-4E AIM-7F Sparrow that entered service in the second half of the 1970s. which, however, was offset by the more powerful aiming system of the MiG-23M.
When examining melee missiles with a thermal seeker, it can be noted that the AIM-9A Sidewinder and P-3C missiles were similar, as were the AIM-9C, Matra R.550 and R-13M. The advantage of the MiG-23M was to equipped with the R-60 for near maneuverable air combat . Similar missiles in 1975 were in the arsenal of probable opponents. The situation changed only later, with the adoption of the AIM-9L with a more sensitive thermal seeker than the P-60. Assessing the cannon armament, it can be noted that in comparison with the American Volcano MG1 cannon, the Soviet GSh-23L had better ballistic characteristics, a larger caliber and a larger projectile weight. The second salvo for both guns was approximately the same. However, the F-4E firing time was 6-7 s, the MiG-23M - 4 s, and the Mirage F-1 - more than 10 s, although the two French DEFA guns were slightly inferior to the GSh-23L in the second volley. A comparison of the aiming and armament systems of the three machines shows that the capabilities of radar sights for detecting air targets, as well as for solving aiming problems, are almost the same, with a slight advantage for the Soviet radar. Sapphire-23D-III had more
This is the trainer with combat capability modification MiG-23U (Flogger-C) with tandem placement of the pilot and cadet and a retractable periscope for the pilot occupying the rear seat. Compared to a single seat fighter, the Flogger-C has a lower fuel reserve, range and duration of flight.
Modifications of the MiG-23 fighter
"23-01" (MiG-23PD, MiG-23UVP) - a prototype with lifting engines. It was equipped with a crusing engine R-27-300 and 2 lift engines RD-36-35. The first flight on April 3, 1967.
"23-11" - a prototype with a variable geometry wing. Equipped with an R-27F-300 engine. The first flight on June 10, 1967. Manufactured 9 aircraft.
MiG-23S - the first production version. It was distinguished by an S-21M weapon control system and K-13 missiles. The first flight on May 21, 1969. In 1969-1971, 50 aircraft were manufactured.
MiG-23 (“product 23-11”) - a serial fighter with a standard S-23 system. It was distinguished by the R-27F2M-300 engine, new wing consoles, shifted back by 860 mm with horizontal plumage and an additional fuselage tank. Produced in the years 1971-1972.
MiG-23A - deck fighter (project). Designed in 1972.
MiG-23B ("product 32-24") - fighter-bomber. Equipped with an AL-21F-3 engine. Designed in the years 1969-1970. It was produced since 1971 at the Znamya Truda plant.
MiG-23BK (“product 32-26”) is a prototype of the MiG-27K fighter-bomber. It was distinguished by a digital sighting and navigation system PrNK-23K and the presence of the Kaira laser television system. Designed in 1974.
MiG-23BM (“product 32-25”) - fighter-bomber for the Soviet Air Force, prototype MiG-27. Designed in 1973.
MiG-23BN (“product 32-23”) is a fighter-bomber with the R-29A-300 engine. It was produced since 1973. Part of the aircraft was converted from the MiG-23M at repair enterprises. Delivered to countries of Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Cuba.
MiG-23K - carrier-based fighter (project) with the R-100 engine, extended wing, air refueling system. Designed in 1976.
MiG-23M ("product 23-11M") - a modernized front-line fighter. It was distinguished by the S-23D-III weapon control system, the R-29-300 engine, a shortened tail coke and wing consals with a deflecting toe. It was produced since 1972 at the Tushino Engineering Plant.
MiG-23ML (“product 23-12”) is a lightweight front-line fighter with the R-35-300 engine and equipment. For the first time, a system of limiting angles of attack was applied. Produced in the years 1976-1985. It was exported.
MiG-23MLA is an advanced front-line fighter, close in its capabilities to MiG-23P. In 1978-1983, 1,100 aircraft were manufactured at the Znamya Truda plant.
MiG-23MLG ("product 23-37") - experienced. It was distinguished by the composition of the equipment.
MiG-23MLD ("product 23-18") - modified. Partially improved equipment, reinforced airframe design. In 1984-1985, 66 aircraft were manufactured at the Znamya Truda plant. In addition, in the early 80s, most of the MiG-23ML converted to the type of MiG-23MLD.
MiG-23MLDG ("product 23-57") - experienced. It was distinguished by the presence of active interference equipment and the composition of the equipment.
MiG-23MLS ("product 23-47") - experienced. It was distinguished by the composition of the equipment.
MiG-23MS - export version of the MiG-23M. It was distinguished by a simplified avionics. It was produced since 1973. Delivered to Algeria, Iraq, Syria, etc.
MiG-23MF - export. The MiG-23MS was distinguished by a more powerful radar. It was produced since 1977. In addition, part of the MiG-23M was converted. Delivered to the countries of the Warsaw Pact.
MiG-23P (“product 23-14”) is an interceptor for air defense based on the MiG-23ML. It was distinguished by the composition of the equipment. It was produced since 1977.
MiG-23UB ("product 23-51") - combat training, with a double cabin. Equipped with an R-27F2M-300 engine. In 1970-1978, 769 aircraft were manufactured in Irkutsk.
MiG-23UM - combat training based on the MiG-23ML. In Irkutsk, 251 aircraft were manufactured.
MiG-23Sh - attack aircraft (project). Designed in 1969.
MiG-23-98 - a modernized front-line fighter. Made in 1999
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MiG-23B-98 is a modernized fighter-bomber.
MiG-23UB-99 - a modernized combat training aircraft.
On July 4, 1989, a plane crash occurred in Belgium. A MiG-23M fighter belonging to the Soviet Air Force fell on a residential building. Killed a local resident. But the unusual situation is that the plane flew 901 kilometers without a pilot.
During the Afghan campaign, despite their great successes, Pakistani pilots refrained from an open meeting with Soviet aircraft, fearing retaliatory attacks by escort fighters, which began to cover up strike groups. When departing for the bombardment, the first to leave were several pairs of MiG-23MLD that set up a protective "zone" along the border and patrol over the very site of the strike. The echelon of their barrage was assigned 1000-1500 m higher than the other participants of the raid, and the necessary duration of flight was provided by an 800-liter fuselage tank. In addition to the GSh-23L gun, the MiGs carried two R-24R missiles with radar seeker, their launch range allowed them to hit targets from 35-45 km of distance, and a pair of R-60M short range missiles with heat seekers. The most experienced pilots were usually assigned to cover the strike group, who conducted an independent search in the area of responsibility with the help of the Sapphire-23ML radar sight (a method called "AWACS to itself").
In the afghan war it was claimed a MiG-23MLD downed a F-16, how was the F-16 shot down? because the MiG-23 did not carry air to air missiles.
One of the Soviet fighters could shoot down the F-16 with cannon fire. MiG-23MLDs always carried full ammunition for the GSh-23L: 250 high-explosive, incendiary, and armor-piercing shells. The bombing attack was usually accompanied by a cannon burst towards the target. Although shooting from a great height did not give much effect, a hundred shells could not interfere with the matter. After the discharge of air to ground weapons, nothing prevented one of the pilots from capturing the F-16 on its sight, which had jumped ahead, with the help of the radar, and the indicator of the respondent “friend or foe” helped to determine that it was the enemy. To drive the F-16 into the sight ring and release the line for an experienced ace is a matter of seconds. To answer the question why the pilot on earth did not report the victory? it’s enough to recall the orders to do not to get involved in the battle “avoiding international complications”, the recent scandal with the downed South Korean Boeing 747 and the incident with the Norwegian Orion; after the incident, the participants were immediately transferred to other garrisons.
After a year in Afghanistan, the 2nd squadron of the same regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Novikov replaced the 2nd squadron of the 982th IAP in Kandahar at the end of May 1985. The beginners accounted for the first combat losses of the MiG-23. Less than a month after arrival, on June 21, a MiG-23MLD did not return, Lieutenant Bagamed Yusupovich Bagamedov, who flew in a pair of MiG-23s to intensify the strike of the Shindand squadron near Kalat, 120 km north-east of Kandahar. The pilot, who was the last to attack, died, but the circumstances remained unclear - his loss was noticed only when the second group came out of the attack. In all likelihood, the young and insufficiently experienced pilot, who was the last to attack, came under increased anti-aircraft fire. On that extremely unfortunate day, the victims were not limited to the loss of the MiG and its pilot: the search helicopter that flew to rescue him, on approaching the fighter’s crash site, came under the fire of the rebels and was also shot down. The pilot and navigator of the Mi-8 managed to leave the helicopter with parachutes, but the flight engineer died in the helicopter crash.
The American pilot Ward Carroll took part in training missions in strict secrecy, during which the MiG-23 fighter served as the enemy. The pilot spoke about his impressions. According to The Drive, in 1985, Ward Carroll was conducting training dogfights on the F-14 in Nevada. The former American pilot admits that he was struck by the size of the Soviet aircraft. The MiG-23, which he had so far seen only in low-quality photographs obtained by intelligence, in reality turned out to be much smaller than the pilot expected. First, a demonstration of the speed of an air enemy was carried out. The pilots of the F-14 and MiG-23 received a command to switch to afterburner mode. “The MiG-23 just left us… First lesson learned: don’t try to outrun the MiG-23,” recalls Ward Carroll of that moment. Then offensive and defensive maneuvers alternated, during which the F-14 managed to get close enough to the MiG to open fire if necessary. At the third stage of training battles, the Soviet fighter again surprised the American pilot. “This time the MiG-23 pilot dived very low and very fast, and the F-14 crew lost sight of him over the desert. Then the Soviet jet reappeared on the wing line and made a mock shot - it was a "real revelation"," the publication says. Rossiyskaya Gazeta
Source: http://bastion-opk.ru/fighter-mig-23-news/ OVT "WEAPON OF THE FATHERLAND" A.V. Karpenko
