With a production rate of about 500 aircraft per year and the prospect of a gradual replacement of most of the MiG-21 (MiG-21) fighters that were still in service with the Soviet Air Forces (Soviet Air Forces), At that time the MiG-23 Flogger family aircraft were the most advanced Soviet fighters of the seventies. In this sense, its only competitor was the Sukhoi Su-19 Fencer fighter-bomber (Su-24 front-line bomber), which significantly exceeded the MiG-23 in terms of flight range and payload mass, and whose production was only a fraction of the production of the Flogger family of aircraft. The Sukhoi plane posed a more serious threat to NATO rear areas like the UK, but if the Soviet Union launched an offensive into Europe in the 1980s, then it would have been the Flogger family of aircraft, the main aircraft for the Soviet Air force in addition to attacks on tactical air bases and communications, The MiG-23 family would had to fight for air supremacy with fighters such as F-15 Eagle, F-16 and Mirage 2000.

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The NATO Air Standards Co-ordinating Committee assigned the designation Flogger-A to the aircraft presented at Domodedovo. All published photographs showed the aircraft with the number 231 printed on the front fuselage in large print (the so-called buzz-number). This copy, which was presented at Domodedovo in 1967 and which is currently on display at the Monino Museum, is obviously a prototype. According to published data, the first model that entered mass production was the MiG-23S (MiG-23С) or Flogger-B (the designation Flogger-B was assigned to the MiG-23M / MF modification; the modification of the MiG-23С received the designation Flogger-A - byakin ), which are believed to have started deliveries n 1971. The main task of the fighter was air defense, and the auxiliary one was to strike at ground targets.

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The closest Western equivalent to the MiG-23 family was the Swedish SAAB Viggen, which was in the same weight and thrust categories. Both aircraft were single-seat machines with short takeoff and landing distances and with the possibility of dual-purpose use (there were various options with a pronounced bias towards the mission of gaining air superiority and attacking ground targets, but also capable of performing an alternative task). Also, both aircraft were somewhat lacking in internal fuel volume and the number of pylons. Nevertheless, the Viggen was the most modern military aircraft of European origin in service the 1970s, and it is from this point of view that the MiG-23 should be considered the same for the Soviet Union.

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55 years ago, the MiG-23 serial front-line fighter made its first flight. Its distinguishing feature was the variable-swept wing. In total, more than 4.6 thousand MiG-23s of various modifications were produced, which were in service with more than 20 countries of the world. These aircraft took part in many armed conflicts. Analysts call the MiG-23 a truly mass-produced fighter, which for a long time became the most recognizable machine of Soviet front-line aviation.

On June 10, 1967, a Soviet serial front-line fighter with a variable-sweep wing MiG-23 took to the skies for the first time. The plane was flown by the honored test pilot Alexander Fedotov.

Work on the creation of a new machine started in the early 1960s in the experimental design bureau (OKB) No. 155. Initially, the aircraft was developed as a further development of the MiG-21 fighter. Grigory Sedov was appointed the chief designer of the project, and Artyom Mikoyan (at a late stage - Rostislav Belyakov) carried out the general management.

One of the key requirements for the new aircraft was the ability to take off from field airfields with short runways, including unpaved ones. In addition, the maximum speed of the fighter was to reach 2500 km / h, and the flight range - 2000 km, which was 17-25% higher than that of the MiG-21.

The machine was also supposed to receive the functions of a multi-role fighter, that is, to be capable of hitting not only air, but also ground targets.

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The first prototype of the aircraft, which received the code E-8, was unsuccessful. This machine was largely based on the design of the MiG-21. And during the tests, it became clear that this approach does not allow to achieve the necessary characteristics and it is necessary to create a fundamentally new fighter.

OKB-155 specialists built two more prototypes: 23-01 and 23-11. The latter was distinguished by a variable sweep of the wing, while the 23-01 had a triangular wing.

The ability to change the wing geometry in flight allowed the pilot, depending on the task or conditions, to adjust the take-off and landing and maneuvering characteristics of the machine.

It was 23-11 that eventually turned into the MiG-23. Its mass production was launched in 1969 at the Znamya Truda Moscow Machine-Building Plant, and testing and fine-tuning of the machine continued until 1973.

Production of the MiG-23 was discontinued in 1985, and it was removed from service with the Russian army in 1993 (the vehicle was replaced by the more modern MiG-29 and Su-27).

https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/1013504-istrebitel-mig-23

MiG-23MLD - some BVR Considerations and Recomendations

MiG-23MLD’s pros and cons – the Soviet view of the 1980s
It would be interesting for the Western public to examine and analyse in details the content of a Soviet Air Force supplementary air combat manual. This particular 32-page manual was published not long after the Bekaa Valley clashes.

The manual concludes that the MiG-23MLD(Export) equipped with the Sapfir-23MLAE-2 radar, SPO-15LE RWR, chaff/flare dispensers and last but not least the R-24/R-60MK AAM combination could be considered reasonably capable of holding its own against all types of enemy fighters. However, the edge over the F-15A – the most capable archrival - could be gained only through multiple simultaneous ‘slash-and-dash’ attacks from several directions and from long ranges. These attacks are required to be organised and executed in decisive manner; with a high degree of coordination between the groups when the engagement goes to the WVR phase, and with timely exit from combat.
The docuemnt contains a host of recommendations to the MiG-23MLD pilot and it has apparently been compiled on the basis of the Bekaa Valley clashes analysis of and numerous mock-up combats flown in the VVS-FA training centers in Lipetsk and Mary. Some if not most, of these recommendations may sound more as general rules rather than as specialised air combat instructions for the MiG-23 drivers. However, it would be appropriately to remind that most of those ‘general-and-vital’ rules were obviously disregarded by the Syrian pilots during the June 1982 war, turning out them to suffer the fate of turkey shoots over the Bekaa Valley.
Probably the most important rule, contained into the recommendation chapter of the manual dealing with the BVR combat, is that on the importance of the first attack as it sounds as follows: “In order to achieve surprise in shooting, the MiG-23MLD pilots should spend all of their experience and aggressiveness of into the first attack.” Undoubtedly, this is considered as critical factor since surprise has been proved to be nine-tents of air combat success, both offensive and defensive. Other critical elements in the success of a fighter sweep or CAP operation are the command, control and communications (C3) of the own fighter force. The ability of fighter pilots to find, identify and engage high-value hostile targets in BVR environment avoiding potential threats from a position of advantage, rest in great measure on relative C3 capabilities. According to the then Soviet air superiority doctrine the air superiority operations require well-honed functioning GCI assistance substituting the lack of AWACS assets; therefore the GCI officers had to maintain maximum possible situation awareness, i.e. where air superiority has to be achieved, where and when enemy aircraft would come and from which direction, etc. The Soviets mastered to perfection this highly-redundant – but far from perfect and rather inflexible - concept that turned out to be useful for the Central European theatre with dense ground radar coverage and numerous GCI centers, with some 200-250 radars of various types were believed to be used in a full scale war situation in Central Europe. However, it was not the same sitation being provided for the Third World MiG-23 operators, as the the somewhat inflexible and custom-tailored Soviet GCI concept, hardly provided the most effective command-and-control solution for them (they simply lacked the required infrastructure and training).
The MiG-23MLD’s radar is said to be capable of detecting fighter-size targets from long distances but it makes the own fighter easily detectable due to the strong emissions which can trigger every and each enemy RWR at a distance of excess of 65nm (120km). In addition, the radar is known as susceptible to active jamming, thus, when flying over own territory with sufficient ground radar coverage, the radar should be switched off and activated only on GCI order. In such cases, the IRST should be the preferred sensor. In order to expand the search zone in a high-threat environment, the Flogger pilot is required to fly a zig-zag pattern with his main attention centered onto the visual search bellow the bottom boundary of the own ground radar coverage (usually bellow 1,000ft [300m] in Central Europe in the 1980s). The purpose of weaving is primarily to allow the pilot to cover his rear quarter more easily (in could be useful to note that most of the MiG-23 kills during the Bekaa Valley were caused by undetected rear-quarter attacks by IDF/AF F-16s using the AIM-9L or F-15As with the Python 3). It is well known that the MiG-23 pilot has ample problems with the rearward and downward field of view as the fighter is designed with a low-drag canopy, faired into the fuselage though the canopy-mounted rear-view mirrors expand to some degree the rearward field of view. Therefore, the MiG-23 pilots would be expected to encounter huge difficulties in keeping a view on a turning bogey or during visual search bellow his aircraft (this is possible only through banking, but the workload on the pilot is excessively high). On the other hand, it has to be noted that the MiG-23MLD is a quick in acceleration thanks to the low-drag airframe and the aerodynamic qualities of the fully-swept wings, and its high speed could increase difficulty encountered by an unseen attacker in satisfying his aiming requirements in the reduced intercept time; this can be used as another defensive factor when flying in enemy or disputed airspace.
During the BVR air combat, the manual recommends strongly that attacks should not be initiated without offensive advantage and the prospect of getting off the first shoot. The general rule: ‘Who shoots first – kills first, in the worst case dictates the engagement’ should be regarded as of particular importance for the MiG-23 community. If the MiG-23 was dictating the engagement, the aircraft could employ to the full extent its advantages as a high-speed ‘chaos’ fighter using ‘slash-and-dash’ attack - a preferable and often the only available method for the MiG-23 community when engaged vs F-16s and F-15s. It is of note that the high-speed energy fighters like the MiG-23 have the option of engaging or disengaging at will, even in the 1980s and 1990s all-aspect BVR and WVR missile environment.
Another possibility is, in favourable tactical situations, groups of well-flown and well-GCI-directed Floggers to ‘gang-up’ of the better turning bogey such as the F-15 or F-16 using multiple aircraft tactics, with ‘snap-up’ attacks. For a reliable radar-ID (also known as Electronic ID or EID) of the detected bandits, several interrogations should be made – as more ID attempts, as little the risk of fratricide. If unknown type of bandit aircraft are encountered, it should be assumed that these may be F-15s – the most capable and hence the most dangerous enemy fighter. The manual stresses that it is prohibited for the MiG-23MLD to close head-on toward any bandit aircraft of unknown type because it is likelihood these to be F-15s possessing better radar performance and longer-range BVR missiles.
It would be also useful to note that an important recommendation to the GCI officers contained in the manual is that during fighter sweep operations it is strictly prohibited for them to vector the MiG-23s in head-on attacks against non-identified bandits because, as noted above, these are likely to be the dangerous F-15s. Nevertheless, if such a situation is unavoidable, then the anti-F-15 tactics, recommended to the MiG-23 pilots and GCI officers is as follows: if the distance to the bandits exceeds 12nm (20km) the MiGs should immediately perform a sharp turn out of the target and got away descending and pulling high-g; the direction of defense break turn depends on the aspect of the threat and usually should be in the closest direction to achieve beam aspect and then to maneuver in order to revert into side-on or tail-on missile attack. If the target is detected side on, than the MiG-23MLD pilots should use chaff and sharp turns in order to evade the Sparrow missiles and them to revert into attack.

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The main drawbacks of variable geometry wings are, extra weight, movement of the center of lift with respect the center of gravity as they swivel, and to be joint to the fixed wing console by pivots, this in many ways limited the MiG-23 family.

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