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The MiG-23/27 family of third-generation fighters was created at a time of general interest in variable wing geometry. It was believed that this significantly improves the flight and tactical properties of fighters, as it helps to combine incompatible qualities: high speed with a long flight range, maneuverability and good takeoff and landing characteristics. In the takeoff and landing mode, the wing was set to a minimum angle. This provided maximum lift, so the aircraft needed relatively short airfields. The flight mode was carried out in the middle position, which achieved significant fuel savings. And in combat or pursuit, the wing planes "clung" to the fuselage, and the aircraft developed maximum speed and better dynamic qualities (acceleration and vertical maneuvers). Changing the sweep angle during air combat made it possible to perform more energetic horizontal maneuvers and take an advantageous position for firing at the enemy in a turn.

The MiG-23 prototype made its first flight on June 10, 1967. In design, it differed significantly from its predecessors. Its main power element was an integral tank-bulkhead No. 2 in the center section, to which the movable wing panels (with a turning mechanism) and the main landing gear were attached. Through significant mechanical stress, this assembly was completely welded from stainless steel. The landing gear had such a complex kinematic assembly scheme, for their development the designer received a Soviet labour prize! The dorsal fin with the rudder had a much larger area than in the MiG-21, and to ensure longitudinal stability, it was also necessary to make a rotary ventral fin (its release was synchronized with the landing gear retraction).

The wing had a developed  (fixed part) and movable consoles that could occupy one of three positions: 16o, 45o and 72o. Each console had powerful mechanization: slats, flaps and spoilers, the deflection angles of which depended on the sweep angle.

The new front-line fighter had an airborne radar and a thermal direction finder or infrared search and track system. For the first time, guided medium-range air-to-air missiles, both with radar and thermal seekers, were included in the armament. A fixed gun- a twin 23-mm GSh-23L was installed under the fuselage.

Serial production of the MiG-23 fighter began in 1969. Since 1970, the MiG-23 began to enter in combat  operational regiments.

The most mass produced variant, the MiG-23M, was created in 1972 and had a new R29-300 engine with a thrust of 12,500 kgf, an improved fire control system, a slightly modified wing with a "dog tooth"  and the possibility of suspending fuel tanks under movable consoles. The number of Air to Air missiles increased to six: two medium-range under the wing glove and 4 small - under the wing on two twin fuselage hardpoints. In 1972-78. more than 1,300 vehicles were built (including export models of the MiG-23 MS and MF) variants.

A deeper modernization was the MiG-23 ML model. The design of the aircraft was significantly lightened, the onboard equipment was improved, and a more powerful engine was installed - R - 35 with a thrust of 13,000 kgf. The tactical flight characteristics have grown so much that theoretically they made it possible to conduct an air battle almost on an equal terms with the American fighters of the 4th generation F-16A. Outwardly, it was distinguished by a reduced dorsal fin extension area. In 1976-78. More than 1000 aircraft of this model were produced.

Since 1979, the Air Defense Forces began to receive the MiG-23P interceptor fighter equipped with semi-automatic targeting equipment according to information received from a ground guidance point or AWACS aircraft

Source https://aviamuseum.com.ua/ru/exposition/exposition/kb-mig/199-mig-23ml




 
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The variety of tasks facing aviation technology has led to the creation of universal, multi-purpose combat aircraft. One of these designs was the MIG-23 aircraft, a representative of the first generation of Soviet combat fighters with a variable geometry swing wing, capable of performing the functions of a front-line fighter, fighter-interceptor and low-altitude fighter-bomber.

In 1964, in OKB-155 A.I. Mikoyan, work began on the creation of a new front-line fighter under the designation "MiG-23". G.A. Sedov was appointed chief designer. General management was carried out by A.I. Mikoyan, and after his death - R.A. Belyakov. The work on the creation of this aircraft was preceded by a large amount of research, in which G.S. Byushgens, G.V. Aleksandrov, S.M. Belotserkovsky, G.I. Zagainov and other leading aerodynamic scientists of TsAGI. In the opinion of the military, during a full-scale war, large airfields with concrete runways would be very vulnerable, so the Air Force needed machines that could be operated from shortened runways. This could be achieved in two ways: through the use of lift engines or the use of a variable geometry wing.

It was proved that the use of a variable-swept wing would make it possible to create a multi-mode combat aircraft, and calculations carried out at TsAGI showed that an aircraft with such a wing would receive a noticeable advantage. With a wing with variable geometry, the sweep of which varies with flight speed, this made it possible to increase the combat radius of the machine by a third and reduce its landing speed by a quarter.

For the MiG-23, a wide sweep range was chosen from 16° for takeoff and landing, long-range cruising and loitering in the air to 72°. Depending on the flight mode, it could become either almost straight or swept. In a very short time, from January to March 1966, a preliminary design of the MiG-23 was created. On June 10, 1967, the first flight of the MiG-23 was made. The aircraft proved to be easy to fly in all wing positions. Serial production of the MiG-23S fighter was mastered at the Moscow Machine-Building Plant No. 30 Znamya Truda in 1969.
From all previous machines created by the Design Bureau (MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21), this fighter differed primarily in its concept - the MiG-23 aircraft was a high-wing aircraft with a variable sweep wing. The high wing-plan arrangement of the wing was chosen in order to provide an opportunity, with a large sweep, to remove part of the wing into the fuselage. The wing consisted of a fixed part and a rotary wing element. The sweep angle of the fixed part along the wing leading edge was 70°, and the movable wing element along the leading edge varied from 16° to 72°. The moving wing element was rotated by a special system SPK-1. The aerodynamic design adopted for the MiG-23 provided it with high load-bearing properties. On takeoff and landing modes, cruising flight  and loitering, a minimum wing sweep angle of 16 ° was used. In this configuration, the aircraft had the highest lift-to-drag ratio, which significantly increased the flight range. In the modes of maneuver and air combat, an average wing sweep angle of 45 ° was used. This configuration allowed for increased operational overloads, improving the speed characteristics of the aircraft. Flight at supersonic speeds, including at high speeds near the ground, was carried out at a maximum wing sweep angle of 72°. Moreover, even in this position of the wing, the aircraft retained high maneuverability at transonic speeds, stability and controllability.

https://victorymuseum.ru/encyclopedia/technic/voenno-vozdushnye-sily/samolet-istrebitel-mig-23ml-sssr/
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MiG-23ML from the 41st regiment, from Burevestnik.
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MiG-23ML from the 979th regiment, from Shchuchin airfield
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MiG-23 at Kandahar airfield
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MiG-23P from the duty unit of the 472nd regiment of the air defence units, Kursk airfield, summer 1997.
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Flight weekdays of the 979th Fighter Aviation Regiment. Shchuchin airfield
Source
https://www.rusarmy.com/forum/threads/monografija-o-mig-23.13115/page-6
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Flights of the MiG-23 from the 22nd regiment, at the airfield "Central Corner" in Vladivostok. Mid 80s, early 90s. Photo: Vyacheslav Muravina, Oleg Morozov and Oleg Taran
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The practical ceiling of the MiG-23ML was increased by a kilometer - up to 18500 m with respect the MiG-23M that had a maximum ceiling of 17500 m . The magnitude of the maximum energy output, which was realized by the very effective rate of climb of the MiG-23ML at subsonic levels, which determines the vertical maneuverability of the new modification, did achieve impressive results. The MiG-23ML has a rate of Max rate of climb  235 m / s (for the MiG-23M its rate of climb is much lower, 193 m / s). The improved rate of climb of the MiG-23ML allowed it to get to a  height of ten kilometers in 2 minutes 45 in full afterburner mode, while the MiG-23M being much heavier, for it took 3 minutes. which made it possible to find an increasingly powerful power plant for the aircraft in order to maintain flight characteristics.  The acceleration from 600 km/h to 1100 km/h in just 17.0  seconds for the MiG-23ML and 22.3 seconds for the MiG-23M.  It took 32 seconds for the MiG-23M to reach supersonic speed (from 600 to 1300 km / h). The MiG-23M climbed to a practical ceiling height of 17500 m in 8.0 minutes.

Thus, the improved variant of the earlier MiG-21 with new weapons equipment was accompanied by a noticeable increase in weight, from the first serial samples to the last of the bis family, which amounted to a noticeable 12% increase weight, while the takeoff weight of the aircraft increased by almost two tons. The same picture accompanied the beginning of the modification process of the hero of our story, whose weight on the way from early prototypes to the MiG-23M increased by more than one and a half tons, adding 17.5% (we are deliberately not talking about flight weights, varying from refueling and loading in accordance with the task, but the weight of an empty machine, the value of which to a certain extent allows us to judge the modernization directions, innovations and constructive approaches). When creating the MiG-23ML,  it was possible to reduce the empty weight of the machine to 10230 kg, reducing 660 kg against the previous modification MiG-23M. Only for radio-electronic equipment, due to the transition to a new element base, the use of lightweight wires and connectors, the weight reduction was 180 kg. The normal take-off weight has become less by almost a ton, amounting to 14320 kg versus 15300 kg for the MiG-23M. In combination with the installation of a more powerful engine, it was thus possible to provide a starting thrust-to-weight ratio equal to 0.91 (for the MiG-23M it was 0.82), for earlier variants the thrust to weight ratio was 0.66 for the MiG-23S and MiG-23 model 1971.

In the stratosphere, under the condition of maintaining a level flight, the aircraft at full afterburner could reach M = 2.6. No less impressive were the achieved characteristics of the MiG-23ML of the fourth squadron of the 234th Guards. The air regiment at the Rissala airbase. The MiG-23ML displayed  a very special horizontal maneuverability: the “visiting MiG-23ML” version of the aircraft was distinguished by the absence of weapons and while performing a secret forced turn of 180° at a low altitude it took only 13 seconds for the MiG-23ML to do it (for the MiG-23M it took 22.3 seconds to perform the same turn, thus gaining more than two seconds versus the MiG-21bis – 18.5 sec) this was also thanks to a reduced wing loading of only 370 kg/m for the lightened MiG-23ML versus the 544 kg/m wing loading of the MiG-23M and 490 kg/m of MiG-23S.

takeoff speed at normal takeoff weight was 280 km / h versus 292 km / h for its predecessor the MiG-23M, and 450 m was enough for takeoff run (580 m for the MiG-23M and 830 m for the MiG-21bis). The landing speed somewhat decreased: even without the use of a braking parachute, the aircraft's flight distance was 880 m - one and a half times less than required by the MiG-23M. With the use of a “brake parachute”, the distance at a normal landing weight, the same for the MiG-23M and MiG-23ML, was reduced from the previous 825 m to 690 m.

In the summer of 1976, the opportunity finally came to assess the qualities of the MiG-23M in the most realistic way, by conducting comparative tests against the American F-5E fighter. “Bringing into battle” a domestic fighter in this case the  MiG-23M with a real American aircraft. It was made possible to obtain a captured copy of the F-5E from Vietnam, where, at the end of the war, a fair amount of military equipment that previously belonged to the South Vietnamese side remained after the fall of Saigon, the remnants of the South Vietnamese army had to leave the country so quickly that dozens of combat aircraft were abandoned safe and sound at military bases and airfields.

The capabilities of the F-5E company were of the greatest interest. The nimble F-5E  was excellent in close air combat,

In these flights, the F-5E was piloted by N. I. Stogov, and the MiG-23M by V. N. Kondaurov, then the pilots changed roles. V. V. Migunov and A. S. Bezhevets also flew. Preliminary calculations testified about the advantages of the MiG-23, whose area of ​​possible attacks was much wider than the F-5E, literally surrounding it from all sides. The results of these test flights were all the more discouraging: the “enemy”, after approaching and starting a fight , slowly but surely ended up in the MiG’s tail  in a favorable position for opening fire. Arguments about a better thrust-to-weight ratio, and the advantage the MiG had at speeds of more than about 800 km/h, which were advantageous for the MiG in terms of higher maneuverability and higher rate of climb and  better acceleration characteristics.

The enemy was slowing down its speed, confidently that holding it on to turns and reaching G-forces beyond the “5Gs”, at which the F-5 achieved a turn with an incredible small radius of a little more than five hundred meters and again ended up in the tail of the MiG-23. For a steady 180° turn, the American fighter took 17.5 seconds, and in most cases the F-5E managed to get into position for firing already on the second turn. Only at high speeds with increased maneuvering radii did the MiG-23 gain the advantage.

Марковский В Ю , Приходченко И В Истребитель МиГ 23 На защите неба Родины

 por Александр Тивиков

https://www.calameo.com/read/00188772198ad5eede3a8

https://www.calameo.com/books/00188772198ad5eede3a8

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With a production rate of about 500 aircraft per year and the prospect of a gradual replacement of most of the MiG-21 (MiG-21) fighters that were still in service with the Soviet Air Forces (Soviet Air Forces), At that time the MiG-23 Flogger family aircraft were the most advanced Soviet fighters of the seventies. In this sense, its only competitor was the Sukhoi Su-19 Fencer fighter-bomber (Su-24 front-line bomber), which significantly exceeded the MiG-23 in terms of flight range and payload mass, and whose production was only a fraction of the production of the Flogger family of aircraft. The Sukhoi plane posed a more serious threat to NATO rear areas like the UK, but if the Soviet Union launched an offensive into Europe in the 1980s, then it would have been the Flogger family of aircraft, the main aircraft for the Soviet Air force in addition to attacks on tactical air bases and communications, The MiG-23 family would had to fight for air supremacy with fighters such as F-15 Eagle, F-16 and Mirage 2000.

The NATO Air Standards Co-ordinating Committee assigned the designation Flogger-A to the aircraft presented at Domodedovo. All published photographs showed the aircraft with the number 231 printed on the front fuselage in large print (the so-called buzz-number). This copy, which was presented at Domodedovo in 1967 and which is currently on display at the Monino Museum, is obviously a prototype. According to published data, the first model that entered mass production was the MiG-23S (MiG-23С) or Flogger-B (the designation Flogger-B was assigned to the MiG-23M / MF modification; the modification of the MiG-23С received the designation Flogger-A - byakin ), which are believed to have started deliveries n 1971. The main task of the fighter was air defense, and the auxiliary one was to strike at ground targets.

The closest Western equivalent to the MiG-23 family was the Swedish SAAB Viggen, which was in the same weight and thrust categories. Both aircraft were single-seat machines with short takeoff and landing distances and with the possibility of dual-purpose use (there were various options with a pronounced bias towards the mission of gaining air superiority and attacking ground targets, but also capable of performing an alternative task). Also, both aircraft were somewhat lacking in internal fuel volume and the number of pylons. Nevertheless, the Viggen was the most modern military aircraft of European origin in service the 1970s, and it is from this point of view that the MiG-23 should be considered the same for the Soviet Union.

55 years ago, the MiG-23 serial front-line fighter made its first flight. Its distinguishing feature was the variable-swept wing. In total, more than 4.6 thousand MiG-23s of various modifications were produced, which were in service with more than 20 countries of the world. These aircraft took part in many armed conflicts. Analysts call the MiG-23 a truly mass-produced fighter, which for a long time became the most recognizable machine of Soviet front-line aviation.

On June 10, 1967, a Soviet serial front-line fighter with a variable-sweep wing MiG-23 took to the skies for the first time. The plane was flown by the honored test pilot Alexander Fedotov.

Work on the creation of a new machine started in the early 1960s in the experimental design bureau (OKB) No. 155. Initially, the aircraft was developed as a further development of the MiG-21 fighter. Grigory Sedov was appointed the chief designer of the project, and Artyom Mikoyan (at a late stage - Rostislav Belyakov) carried out the general management.

One of the key requirements for the new aircraft was the ability to take off from field airfields with short runways, including unpaved ones. In addition, the maximum speed of the fighter was to reach 2500 km / h, and the flight range - 2000 km, which was 17-25% higher than that of the MiG-21.

The machine was also supposed to receive the functions of a multi-role fighter, that is, to be capable of hitting not only air, but also ground targets.

The first prototype of the aircraft, which received the code E-8, was unsuccessful. This machine was largely based on the design of the MiG-21. And during the tests, it became clear that this approach does not allow to achieve the necessary characteristics and it is necessary to create a fundamentally new fighter.

OKB-155 specialists built two more prototypes: 23-01 and 23-11. The latter was distinguished by a variable sweep of the wing, while the 23-01 had a triangular wing.

The ability to change the wing geometry in flight allowed the pilot, depending on the task or conditions, to adjust the take-off and landing and maneuvering characteristics of the machine.

It was 23-11 that eventually turned into the MiG-23. Its mass production was launched in 1969 at the Znamya Truda Moscow Machine-Building Plant, and testing and fine-tuning of the machine continued until 1973.

Production of the MiG-23 was discontinued in 1985, and it was removed from service with the Russian army in 1993 (the vehicle was replaced by the more modern MiG-29 and Su-27).

https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/1013504-istrebitel-mig-23

MiG-23MLD - some BVR Considerations and Recomendations

MiG-23MLD’s pros and cons – the Soviet view of the 1980s
It would be interesting for the Western public to examine and analyse in details the content of a Soviet Air Force supplementary air combat manual. This particular 32-page manual was published not long after the Bekaa Valley clashes.

The manual concludes that the MiG-23MLD(Export) equipped with the Sapfir-23MLAE-2 radar, SPO-15LE RWR, chaff/flare dispensers and last but not least the R-24/R-60MK AAM combination could be considered reasonably capable of holding its own against all types of enemy fighters. However, the edge over the F-15A – the most capable archrival - could be gained only through multiple simultaneous ‘slash-and-dash’ attacks from several directions and from long ranges. These attacks are required to be organised and executed in decisive manner; with a high degree of coordination between the groups when the engagement goes to the WVR phase, and with timely exit from combat.
The docuemnt contains a host of recommendations to the MiG-23MLD pilot and it has apparently been compiled on the basis of the Bekaa Valley clashes analysis of and numerous mock-up combats flown in the VVS-FA training centers in Lipetsk and Mary. Some if not most, of these recommendations may sound more as general rules rather than as specialised air combat instructions for the MiG-23 drivers. However, it would be appropriately to remind that most of those ‘general-and-vital’ rules were obviously disregarded by the Syrian pilots during the June 1982 war, turning out them to suffer the fate of turkey shoots over the Bekaa Valley.
Probably the most important rule, contained into the recommendation chapter of the manual dealing with the BVR combat, is that on the importance of the first attack as it sounds as follows: “In order to achieve surprise in shooting, the MiG-23MLD pilots should spend all of their experience and aggressiveness of into the first attack.” Undoubtedly, this is considered as critical factor since surprise has been proved to be nine-tents of air combat success, both offensive and defensive. Other critical elements in the success of a fighter sweep or CAP operation are the command, control and communications (C3) of the own fighter force. The ability of fighter pilots to find, identify and engage high-value hostile targets in BVR environment avoiding potential threats from a position of advantage, rest in great measure on relative C3 capabilities. According to the then Soviet air superiority doctrine the air superiority operations require well-honed functioning GCI assistance substituting the lack of AWACS assets; therefore the GCI officers had to maintain maximum possible situation awareness, i.e. where air superiority has to be achieved, where and when enemy aircraft would come and from which direction, etc. The Soviets mastered to perfection this highly-redundant – but far from perfect and rather inflexible - concept that turned out to be useful for the Central European theatre with dense ground radar coverage and numerous GCI centers, with some 200-250 radars of various types were believed to be used in a full scale war situation in Central Europe. However, it was not the same sitation being provided for the Third World MiG-23 operators, as the the somewhat inflexible and custom-tailored Soviet GCI concept, hardly provided the most effective command-and-control solution for them (they simply lacked the required infrastructure and training).
The MiG-23MLD’s radar is said to be capable of detecting fighter-size targets from long distances but it makes the own fighter easily detectable due to the strong emissions which can trigger every and each enemy RWR at a distance of excess of 65nm (120km). In addition, the radar is known as susceptible to active jamming, thus, when flying over own territory with sufficient ground radar coverage, the radar should be switched off and activated only on GCI order. In such cases, the IRST should be the preferred sensor. In order to expand the search zone in a high-threat environment, the Flogger pilot is required to fly a zig-zag pattern with his main attention centered onto the visual search bellow the bottom boundary of the own ground radar coverage (usually bellow 1,000ft [300m] in Central Europe in the 1980s). The purpose of weaving is primarily to allow the pilot to cover his rear quarter more easily (in could be useful to note that most of the MiG-23 kills during the Bekaa Valley were caused by undetected rear-quarter attacks by IDF/AF F-16s using the AIM-9L or F-15As with the Python 3). It is well known that the MiG-23 pilot has ample problems with the rearward and downward field of view as the fighter is designed with a low-drag canopy, faired into the fuselage though the canopy-mounted rear-view mirrors expand to some degree the rearward field of view. Therefore, the MiG-23 pilots would be expected to encounter huge difficulties in keeping a view on a turning bogey or during visual search bellow his aircraft (this is possible only through banking, but the workload on the pilot is excessively high). On the other hand, it has to be noted that the MiG-23MLD is a quick in acceleration thanks to the low-drag airframe and the aerodynamic qualities of the fully-swept wings, and its high speed could increase difficulty encountered by an unseen attacker in satisfying his aiming requirements in the reduced intercept time; this can be used as another defensive factor when flying in enemy or disputed airspace.
During the BVR air combat, the manual recommends strongly that attacks should not be initiated without offensive advantage and the prospect of getting off the first shoot. The general rule: ‘Who shoots first – kills first, in the worst case dictates the engagement’ should be regarded as of particular importance for the MiG-23 community. If the MiG-23 was dictating the engagement, the aircraft could employ to the full extent its advantages as a high-speed ‘chaos’ fighter using ‘slash-and-dash’ attack - a preferable and often the only available method for the MiG-23 community when engaged vs F-16s and F-15s. It is of note that the high-speed energy fighters like the MiG-23 have the option of engaging or disengaging at will, even in the 1980s and 1990s all-aspect BVR and WVR missile environment.
Another possibility is, in favourable tactical situations, groups of well-flown and well-GCI-directed Floggers to ‘gang-up’ of the better turning bogey such as the F-15 or F-16 using multiple aircraft tactics, with ‘snap-up’ attacks. For a reliable radar-ID (also known as Electronic ID or EID) of the detected bandits, several interrogations should be made – as more ID attempts, as little the risk of fratricide. If unknown type of bandit aircraft are encountered, it should be assumed that these may be F-15s – the most capable and hence the most dangerous enemy fighter. The manual stresses that it is prohibited for the MiG-23MLD to close head-on toward any bandit aircraft of unknown type because it is likelihood these to be F-15s possessing better radar performance and longer-range BVR missiles.
It would be also useful to note that an important recommendation to the GCI officers contained in the manual is that during fighter sweep operations it is strictly prohibited for them to vector the MiG-23s in head-on attacks against non-identified bandits because, as noted above, these are likely to be the dangerous F-15s. Nevertheless, if such a situation is unavoidable, then the anti-F-15 tactics, recommended to the MiG-23 pilots and GCI officers is as follows: if the distance to the bandits exceeds 12nm (20km) the MiGs should immediately perform a sharp turn out of the target and got away descending and pulling high-g; the direction of defense break turn depends on the aspect of the threat and usually should be in the closest direction to achieve beam aspect and then to maneuver in order to revert into side-on or tail-on missile attack. If the target is detected side on, than the MiG-23MLD pilots should use chaff and sharp turns in order to evade the Sparrow missiles and them to revert into attack.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The main drawbacks of variable geometry wings are, extra weight, movement of the center of lift with respect the center of gravity as they swivel, and to be joint to the fixed wing console by pivots, this in many ways limited the MiG-23 family.

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