Soviet Union
According to the results of the Afghan epic campaign, the MiG-23 proved to be a reliable and robust machine, proving its suitability not only to carry out fighter missions (the “escorting of attackers” This effectively provided the 40th Army air force with air defense, preventing possible opposition from the enemy fighters), but also proved to be reliable way to deal with the hardships of the daily service — bombing and assault strikes, and reconnaissance. During the five months of service of the 120th air group campaign, the tasks were distributed as follows: 37 of the existing MiG-23 aircraft carried out 5730 sorties, and 1 squadron had 3950 sorties and, accordingly, 2350 flight hours. Of these, 3300 sorties were carried out on bombardments, during which 1300 tons of bombs were dropped, 529 - on escort missions and 121 on reconnaissance. The average intensity was 35-40 departures per daily shift with the execution of 25-30 t bomb attacks, and even there were days when it was executed 16-18 departures. Six pilots were awarded orders of the Red Banner, 30 awarded orders of the Red Star.
The quality of the MiG-23 confirmed the analysis of the reliability indicators of aircraft, conducted by the Air Force Engineering Department of the 40 Army and 73 VA. In difficult conditions, the MiG-23 proved to be quite reliable and durable aircraft. Due to the good operational suitability of the aircraft, most of the work in preparation for the flights could be performed from the ground, without the use of bulky stepladders and supports, which reduced the complexity and duration of maintenance. This ensured in the modification of the MiG-23ML, the reliability of the design and the main units, in combination with a well thought-out maintenance overhauls, significantly reduced the labor costs for the preparation of the equipment.
MiG-23 sample 1971 168th IAP, Starokonstantinov, summer 1973
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MiG-23MS (export version with simplified avionics) Deprived of an effective radar, the aircraft was not able to conduct air battles at medium distances
The ceremonial formation of the personnel of the 32nd GIAP, and before the formation - the commander of the guard regiment, Colonel A.B. Bokach. Since Alexander Borisovich stayed at this post for a relatively short time (only about a year), the time when the picture was taken, judging by the situation, can most likely refer to the spring-summer of 1985. In the background on the right, therefore, is the MiG-23MLD regiment.
"Goodwill Visit"
Soviet MiG-23MLA fighters from the 234th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment at the air base of the Finnish Air Force Rissala; August 1978
After the battles in Lebanon, the USSR Air Force launched an accelerated modernization program for the MiG-23ML / MLA (product 23-18), which was then in service, to the level of the MiG-23MLD, a version already created on the eve of the events in question. About 560 MiG-23ML / MLA were modernized.
At the same time, between the middle of 1982 and December 1984, 66 new MiG-23MLD aircraft were built, the difference from which of the ML / MLA was only in the new, improved avionics. These 66 machines received the designation MiG-23MLD Export (product 23-19 or alternative marking - product 23-22). These export models were delivered to Syria (50 aircraft) and to Bulgaria (16 aircraft). The difference between the export version and the Soviet one was that in the domestic Soviet version the maneuverability of the aircraft was significantly improved, thanks to a number of improvements in the fighter’s airframe and wings and its control system.
[The MiG-23MLD Export was a MiG-23ML / MLA with improved avionics, but the previous airframe like the ML.]
In October 1989, a Syrian pilot hijacked the MiG-23MLD Exported to Israel piloted by him, landing him at Megiddo airbase. This gave the Israelis a great opportunity to evaluate this model and they conducted a series of training battles between this MiG and all types of their fighters. Tests showed that the new MiG had very little superiority over the early F-16 model in acceleration and “energy maneuverability” at speeds over 900 km / h.
In the USSR, a 32-page manual was published for pilots on air combat on the MiG-23MLD Export versus F-15A, F-16A, F-4E and Kfir C2.
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Compared to the F-15A, it is said that the MiG-23MLD Export has one unique advantage in rate of climb at speeds of more than 1,150 km / h.
Compared with the F-16A, the MiG-23MLD Export has a slight superiority in the established turn rate at altitudes of more than 5000 m and speeds close to maximum. And also in rate of climb at speeds less than 1000 km / h. At altitudes of less than 4000 m, the MiG has superiority in “energy maneuverability” at all speeds.
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The manual's authors claim that in comparison with the F-4E (though whether they mean the slatted or non-slatted sub-version of the Phantom is not clear), the MiG-23MLD has superior sustained turn performance throughout the entire envelope, excluding the range between 377 and 540kts (700 and 1,000km/h) below 21,000ft (6,400m). It also has the edge over the Phantom II in zoom climb performance at all altitudes and speeds, excluding the true airspeed range between 485 and 647kts (900 and ,200km/h) above 18,000ft (6,000m).
Compared with the F-15A, the MiG-23MLD's only notable advantage is in zoom climb performance at speeds above 620kts (1,150km/h). However, the manual asserts that compared with the F-16A, the Soviet swing-wing fighter produces a somewhat better sustained turn performance above 15,000ft (5,000m), at speeds close to the maximum, as well as better zoom climb performance at true airspeeds exceeding 590kts (1,100km/h).
Compared to Kfir C2, it is said that the MiG has superiority in the established turn rates at speeds above 1000 km / h and in rate of climb at speeds less than 1000 km / h. At low altitudes less than 4000 m, the MiG has superiority in “energy maneuverability” over the entire speed range. It is curious that MiG pilots are recommended, however, to avoid maneuvering combat with Kfir in the horizontal plane, in turns in every possible way.
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The statements and recommendations on conducting combat with the F-15A and F-16A are also contradictory. It is alleged that in close maneuverable combat, the F-15A and F-16A do not have significant superiority over the MiG, but it is recommended to avoid prolonged close combat at any cost, since the F-15 and F-16 are much more maneuverable and it is much easier for them to take the position of effective fire. If the MiG attacked, but within a minute could not reach the line of fire, then it is recommended that he immediately leave the battle, using his high-speed qualities. In general, it is recommended that the MiG pilot maintain high speed, since the slower the speed, the more maneuverable superiority of opponents will be manifested. Sharp braking is recommended only if necessary to open fire and when avoiding an enemy missile. If the MiG is attacked by the enemy, it is recommended to immediately begin defensive maneuvering (as opposed to attacking maneuvering).
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The manual assures MiG-23 pilots that the F-15A or F-16A have no valuable advantage in their close air combat weapons. However, these US new generation fighters are regarded as being much more manoeuvrable, and could consequently achieve a weapons employment solution in their turning engagements much easier and earlier than the MiG-23MLD. In view of this, MiG-23MLD pilots are strongly advised that prolonged turning engagements against F-15As and F-16As, both
offensive and defensive, should be avoided by all means.
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If an unknown type of 'bandit' is encountered, it should be assumed that it is an F-15 - the most capable and hence the most dangerous, enemy fighter. The manual stresses that the MiG23MLD is prohibited from closing head-on with any such adversary, as these may well be F-15s with better radar performance and longer-range BVR missiles. For this reason, one piece of advice that the manual directs specifically at GCI officers is that during fighter sweep operations it would be strictly against the rules for them to vector MiG-23s in head-on attacks against non-identified bandits. However, if such a situation is unavoidable, then the tactics recommended to MiG-23 pilots and GCI officers are as follows: "If the distance to the 'bandits' exceeds 12nm (20km), the MiGs should immediately make a sharp turn away from the target, descending and pulling high-g and then reverting to a 'side-on' or 'tail-on' missile attack. If the target is detected side on, the MiG-23MLD pilot should use chaff and turn away sharply in order to evade the Sparrow missiles, and then revert to attack."
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The article also says that the MiG-23MLD Export inherited many of the shortcomings inherent in its predecessors, the MiG-23MF and ML, such as poor controllability at high angles of attack, comparative slowness in turns and rolls both in horizontal and vertical planes at high subsonic speeds at a wing angle of 45 degrees.
Some of these shortcomings were significantly reduced in the home version of the MiG-23MLD, thanks to aerodynamic modifications in this model, although they could not completely get rid of them.
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The former Dutch Air Force pilot, Mr. Leon van Maurer. According to the retired pilot (total flying time - more than 3,000 hours, of which 1,200 hours on the F-16) claimed that the MiG-23MLD had "overwhelming superiority over the F-16A on the verticals and in no way inferior to this aircraft in turns. " In addition, "a more powerful radar gives the Russian fighter significant advantages when engaging in combat at long distances." According to van Maurer, "when we (in the Netherlands) received the American Fighting Falcons, I thought I was piloting the best fighter, but, after landing in the cockpit of a Russian plane, I realized that I was mistaken ...". It should be noted that the Dutch pilot first got acquainted with the MiG-23 (probably the former Egyptian MiG-23MS) back in the late 80s; and at the American Nellis Air Force Base (Texas). Later, in the early 90s, he studied the MiG-23ML at one of the German air bases, and the MiG-23MLD while flying as a mercenary pilot for the Angolan air force.
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In addition to the modifications of the MiG-23ML, MLD, in the mid-70s there was an interceptor designed to replace the aging Su-9s. When developing a new interceptor (aircraft 23-14, ed. 6), the MiG-23ML was taken as the basis. Since the changes affected mainly the set of equipment, interceptor tests were carried out in a short time. Already in 1978-79, The new variant began to enter service in the air defense regiments under the designation MiG-23P (P - interceptor), in the NATO codes - Flogger-G. By the design of the airframe, it was like its colleague MiG-23ML, since it also was assembled at the Moscow Znamya Truda machine-building plant. However, the difference in the tasks it was assigned (the main of which was interaction with the country's air defense system) led to the installation of other equipment on the MiG-23P, which caused a change in the location of part of the access hatches.
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On the MiG-23P were installed:
ASP-23P rifle scope;
automatic control system SAU-23PM;
Radar Sapphire-23P (Amethyst N006);
new radio station R-862;
heat locator TP-23M; equipment for automatic guidance of the aircraft to the target by commands of various automated fighter guidance systems.
After detecting and tracking the target on the onboard radar, the aircraft` systems took control of the aircraft, taking it to the position of missile launch along the optimal path.
The aircraft was built in series at MAPO in 1978-1983. In 1978-79 MiG-23P began to enter the air defense aviation, quickly replacing the Su-9 and Su-11 from that moment onwards.
The set of weapons, including for operations against ground targets, was the same as that of the MiG-23ML, but it was not fully used in combat units. So on this plane, pilots did not fulfill the tasks of hitting ground targets, and other equipment for using guided and unguided missile and bomb weapons from warehouses were never in demand.
After the decision of the Soviet government in 1989 to reduce tactical nuclear forces, the possibility of using the MiG-23P on ground targets almost completely disappeared. The fact is that in accordance with this decision, on most of the MiG-23, including all MiG-23P, a special bomb weapon system and the Delta system were dismantled, which allowed the use of the X-23 missile air-to-ground class. Improvements for partial "demilitarization" of MiGs were carried out by specialists directly in combat units.
Currently, several dozens of MiG-23P interceptor series are being operated, which differ slightly in equipment.
Since 1978, deliveries of the MiG-23MF and MiG-23BH to the allies of the USSR under the Warsaw Treaty began. The first aircraft received Bulgaria (more than 40 fighters and fighter-bombers, as well as nine training aircraft), GDR (45 MiG-23MF and MiG-23UB, 30 MiG-23BH) ​​and Czechoslovakia (50 MiG-23MF and 40 MiG-23BH ) In 1979, the MiG-23MF aircraft were delivered to Poland (36 fighters, as well as six MiG-23UB UTS), in 1980 - Romania (32 fighters and four UTS) and Hungary (16 MiG-23MF and four MiG-23UB) .
The MiG-23MS and MiG-23BH were widely exported to third world countries, which was facilitated, in addition to high performance characteristics, by the relatively low cost of fighters. So, in 1980 prices, one MiG-23MS was “sold out” for 3.6-6.6 million dollars.
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In 1974, the MiG-23MS, MF, BH and UB appeared near Libya, a little later these types of aircraft were delivered to the Air Force of Algeria (66 MiG-23MS, MF, BH and UB), Egypt (45 MiG-23MS and BH), Iraq (in 1974 they received 15 MiG-23MS, and then another 30 MiG-23MF, MiG-23ML and MLD, as well as about 80 MiG-23BH and MiG-27) and Syria (about 170 MiG-23MS, MF, ML, MLD and BH). The MiG-23 planes of the Egyptian Air Force, left without spare parts after a sharp deterioration in Soviet-Egyptian relations, were mothballed at the Mersa Matruh airbase. In the future, several of these machines were sold in the USA and China, the scandalously famous Russian concern "ANT" planned to deliver engines for them, but the deal did not take place. The Chinese made an attempt to copy the MiG-23. However, the prototype J-11 was never brought to mass production, although some of its elements (air intake, folding dorsal flange, equipment elements) were implemented on the J-8-II interceptor.
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In May 1981 to decide on the transfer of 30 MiG-23BH and MiG-23MF fighters to Syria.
MiG-23ML aircraft were delivered to Syria in 1982. In 1984, aircraft of this type appeared in North Korea, and in 1985 the MiG-23ML fighter aircraft received the GDR and Czechoslovakia Air Force.
14 MiG-23MLD of the Soviet Air Force were deployed at the Soviet air base Kamran (Vietnam) to ensure its air defense.
By the end of 1994, the MiG-23 were in service with the Algerian Air Force (more than 60 MiG-23MS, MF, BH and UB), Angola (more than 80 aircraft of various modifications), Afghanistan (more than 25 aircraft), Bulgaria (more than 40 MiG-23MF and BH, as well as nine MiG-23UB), Hungary, (16 MiG-23MF and four MiG-23UB), Vietnam (30), India (130 MiG-23MF and BH, as well as 165 MiG-27L Bahadur), Iraq (72 fighter and fighter-bomber, as well as 11 fighter aircraft), North Korea (60 MiG-23ML and UB), Cuba (18 MiG-23MS, 35 MiG-23BH and two MiG-23UB), Libya (85 MiG-23MF, 38 MiG-23BH and 15 UTS), Poland (24 MiG-23MF and four MiG-23UM MiG-23MF and UB), Syria (175 MiG-23MS, MF, MLD and UB), ehii (37 Mig-23BM, 35-Mig Mig 23MF and four-23UM), Ethiopia (50 Mig-23BH, MS and UM), Southern Yemen (25). In addition, 110 MiG-23MF, ML BH and UB aircraft went to Germany after the merger of the two Germanys. China had two or three MiG-23s obtained from Egypt (MiGs were carefully studied by the Chinese, many of their design decisions were used to create the J-8-II). The U.S. Air Force also acquired its own MiG-23: several MC and BH modification vehicles were handed over to the Americans by the Egyptians in the late 1970s and sent to a special secret squadron engaged in testing Soviet aircraft (there were already MiG-17, MiG-19 and MiG-21). One of these aircraft crashed a well-known American pilot, General Robert S. Bond (the flight was carried out as part of the Stealth program: the US Air Force was interested in how “invisibility” would be detected by the radar of Soviet fighters). In 1991, several MiG-23ML was received by the Americans from Germany. A small number of MiG-23MS in the late 1980s was transferred by Libya to its ally - Sudan.
The 179th air regiment in the 1960s and the 1970s flew with MiG-19 ‘Farmer’ and Su-9 ‘Fishpot’ types as an Interceptor regiment. In 1978 the regiment received used MiG-23M Flogger-B types and started the air combat maneuvering training. At the end of the seventies the independent 8th Independent Air Defence Army discontinued and the 179th regiment was transferred to the 14th Tactical Air Army. The MiG-23's were painted camouflage and served as a tactical fighter for a short time.
In 1983 the 179th regiment was given a new role. After the 289th division's 236th regiment moved to Czechoslovakia with their MiG-27's, they took it's the role. The MiG-23M ‘Flogger-B’ type was flown as a fighter-bomber. The regiment's camouflage, yellow page number MiG-23s were discharged from the air to air rocket launcher rails. After that they practiced with air to ground weapons.
rom 1988 the 179th regiment returned to the Soviet Air Defense Force.
The 179th Regiment's roles in the second half of the Cold War:
- early 60s to 1978 Interceptor role with Su-9
- 1978 to 1984 Tactical Fighter role with MiG-23M
- 1984 to 1988 Fighter Bomber role with MiG-23M
- 1988 to 1992 Interceptor role with MiG-23M
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The maximum calculated climb rate on the MiG-23 variant of 1971 is 174 m / s, which is not a very large indicator for a fighter of this class. In the MiG-23M, due to a much more powerful engine, the rate of climb increased to 222m / s, almost 50m / s. This figure is already consistent with the "status" of a powerful fighter. On the MiG-23ML, mainly due to weight reduction, the climb rate reached 242m / s, which corresponds to the most powerful aircraft of the 2nd and 3rd generation, as well as to some 4th-generation fighters. At supersonic wing at 72 degrees of swept has a relatively low air drag, which leads to a rather remarkable result when the maximum rate of climb at high speeds and altitudes is equal to the maximum rate of climb on the ground, especially on the MiG-23ML graphs.
The results of the comparison.
In general, by considering the flight performance of the 3 modifications of the MiG-23, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. The characteristics of the machine improved from modification to modification, due to the improvement of the engine, and in the case of the MiG-23ML and due to weight reduction.
2. During the transition from the MiG-23 variant of 1971 to the MiG-23M, the most significant progress was achieved in the field of acceleration and rate of climb characteristics, but also an improvement in turn rate characteristics was achieved.
3. The MiG-23ML significantly exceeded the MiG-23M in turn parameters, while the progress in acceleration and rate of climb characteristics is also very noticeable.
4. The improvement in flight performance from modification to modification clearly suggests that the MiG-23M in most cases will win in close combat with the MiG-23 arr71, and the MiG-23ML in most cases will win in close combat with the MiG-23M.
As Interavia magazine wrote: “... the conclusion was incorrect that a guided missile could replace a pilot capable of orienting himself and changing the position of an aircraft in aerial combat.” Improvements to increase the maneuverability of the MiG-23ML brought him to the level of the best fighters of the West. Arming it with R-60, and later R-73 missiles, significantly increased the efficiency of the fighter. This conclusion was reached by Israeli specialists after testing the Syrian MiG-23ML, which in 1989 hijacked a Syrian pilot, Major Abdul Bassem, into Israel. In the course of research, it was found, in particular, that the MiG-23ML is superior in acceleration characteristics to the F-16A, which is in service with Israel and participated in joint tests with the Syrian aircraft.
The MiG-23 variants have different wing loading and thrust to weight ratio, MiG-23S had a wing loading of 490 kg per square meter and thrust to weight of 0.66. MiG-23M had a wing loading of 564 kg per square meter and thrust to weight of 0.81.
MiG-23ML had a wing loading of 370 kg per square meter and thrust to weight of 0.91.
The acceleration rate of the MiG-23 at sea level and from 600 km/h to 1100 km/h for the MiG-23 model 1971 in this configuration is about 23 km / h / per second, the acceleration rate of the MiG-23M corresponds to about 27 km / h / per second, and the acceleration rate increase of the MiG-23ML reaches 29 km / h per second. Converting this to acceleration time, we can say that at the sea level by every 100 km / h of speed increase, for the MiG-23 object 1971 will take it a time length of about 4.35 seconds, the MiG-23M in 3.7 seconds, and the MiG-23ML in 3.45 seconds.
To detect air targets, a TP-23M or TP-26 heat direction finder is also used (it has a maximum detection range of jet aircraft in the rear hemisphere against a background of free space of up to 60 km). The heat direction finder allows you to quietly get close to the enemy at a distance of launching missiles from the TGS. It has the following modes of operation: T-I - target designation of missiles R-60, R-23T, R-24T and K-13M in the range of 60 ° in azimuth and 15 ° in elevation; TI - due to the narrowing of the viewing sector to +/- 7 ° in azimuth and +/- 3 ° in elevation increases the image scale; T-III - the main mode, used for auto tracking of targets maneuvering with angular speeds of 6-8 ° / s. Information from the radar and the heat detector, including the reticle for cannon fire, is output to the ILS.
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Angolan clashes
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Angola was another theater of operations in which the MiG-23 was widely used. About fifty MiG-23ML and MiG-23UB piloted by Cuban "volunteers" were sent to help the government forces, which were fought by UNITA rebels, openly supported by South Africa, in 1985. The main purpose of the aircraft was to provide air defense of vital areas of the country, in particular, the capital of Luanda. In 1987, after another aggravation of the conflict, fighters were deployed to the south. So, one MiG-23 squadron was deployed in the area of ​​Namibe, 170 km from the border with Namibia.
By that time, several military clashes had already occurred in the south between Angolan and South African aircraft, during which (according to South Africa) the Mirage F. 1s shot down three MiG-21 MFs. However, with the advent of the MiG-23 in the war zone, South African aviation also began to suffer losses. In early 1987, one “F.1AZ Mirage” was shot down over the northern regions of Namibia. A few months later, another fighter of this type in an air battle with the MiG-23 received a hit of the R-60M missile. His pilot managed to reach the border and escape, but the plane was lost.
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In 1989, at a gala evening at the Moscow Aviation Institute dedicated to the anniversary of the Mikoyan Design Bureau (where the author of these lines also visited), an unexpectedly Angolan pilot took the floor, introducing himself as an Angola Air Force pilot who fought on the MiG-23. Thanking R. A. Belyakov and other Mikoyanovites for a good plane, the Angolan said that he shot down an Impala attack aircraft on it.
