As it is known, in the air battles of 1981 the Syrian Air Force had large losses. A question may arise, why? After all, during the " Yom Kippur War", the Syrian pilots almost completely destroyed the Squadrons of Israeli Phantoms and was able to neutralize the Mirage. The fact is that then the fighting took place over the Golan heights, in the field of view of the control points of the Syrian air force, with the total numerical
superiority of the Syrian Air Force. Now everything has changed, the fighting moved to the seaside to the valleys hidden to the Syrian radars by a mountain range. The only possibility of knowing the air situation was sending a single reconnaissance aircraft with further actions "according to circumstances", which the Syrians did. Nevertheless the Soviet fighters were used outside the field of vision of ground guidance services.
In 1978 the Air Force of Israel was qualitatively strengthened due to the supply of the new fighter aircraft F-15, F-16 and long-range radar surveillance aircraft (EWS) E-2C "Hawkeye". The stationing of stationary radars on the territory of Lebanon required time and
Soviet specialists proposed to refrain altogether from flying over the south of the country, especially since the Syrian Air Force did not have maneuverable fighters, equipped with powerful radars and medium-range missiles.
Sometimes it is said the opinion that the Syrians are forced to wait until the MiG-23MF were used as "armed" flying radars for the
MiG-25. However this is absolutely wrong. There are only two cases when the MiG-25s were used in the Lebanon war, described in
7th the article by V. Babich . In the first case, on February 19, 1981, a MiG-25 was sent down, directed
to intercept a pair of RF-4 scouts flying at middle height. The MiG-25 was attacked by a F-15, which was ambushed the MiG-25 hidden by a ridge.
The case showed that in the absence of a radar field over the Bekaa valley and southern Lebanon It was mortally dangerous to attack even high-altitude targets, because none of the types of Syrian fighter aircraft were equipped with lock down shoot down radars, capable of seeing targets against the background of the ground.
In subsequent operations, the MiG-25s only were sent to combat duty after the deployment in Lebanon, of the air defense system "Feda" and only from ambush positions, using as baits the maneuverable MiG-21, this only lasted until the appearance in Lebanon of a squadron of MiG-23MF, equipped with medium-range Air to Air missiles and pilots who mastered their use. One of such fights is described by V. Babich, on July 19, 1981, and this ended with the destruction of two F-15 and the loss of a single MiG-25.
Analysis of the tactical situation showed that the natural terrain, the deployment of AWACS
aircraft and air control command posts such as the Boeing-707 gave Israel the overwhelming superiority that could not be compensated even by the supply to Syria of the MiG-23ML.
In 1976, after a Syrian passenger plane was fired upon from a grenade launcher, Syria brought troops into Lebanon. The combat missions began to be carrird out by the Syrian MiG-23s.
On June 14, 1976, the Syrian pilot Lt. Mahmud Muslikh Yassin hijacked a MiG-23MS into Iraq.
According to researcher Tom Cooper, on April 26, 1981, two Syrian MiG-23MS with R-13M Air to Air missiles shot down two Israeli A-4 ground-attack aircraft carrying out a bombing mission over Lebanon (these losses are not confirmed by the Israeli side; according to Western sources, these losses are confirmed ).
According to Israeli data, on April 21, 1982 Israeli fighter aircraft F-16A shot down two Syrian MiG-23 aircraft. What modifications were the aircraft, fighters or bombers, pilots and their fate is not reported.
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MiG-23 baptism of fire took place in the sky of Lebanon. In general, the Syrian Air Force fighters during active hostilities from June 6 to 12, 1982 destroyed 42 Israeli aircraft in air battles (including at least five F-15A and six F-16A), as well as one UAV, having lost while four MiG-23MS, six MiG-23MF, 26 MiG-21bis and 11 MiG-21MF. In addition, Israeli F-16A fighters managed to destroy seven Su-22Ms and several MiG-23BNs. A certain advantage in favor of Israel can be explained not only by the difference in the combat capabilities of aviation equipment, but also by the widespread use of AWACS and electronic warfare aircraft, better proven tactics for the combat use of fighter aircraft, as well as higher flight and tactical training of pilots. Evaluating the MiG-23, one "major Israeli commander" who wanted to remain incognito, in an interview with Flight International magazine said: "My opinion ... is that: Soviet aircraft are very good, judging by what we know about their capabilities and what we saw on However, the Syrian pilots often acted not when needed, and not where needed
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Air Force Syria aircraft played a minor role in the air battles over Lebanon in June 1982.
On June 6, a pair of Syrian MiG-23MF flew to intercept an Israeli UAV over the Baal-Bek area. A Syrian pilot, Mr. Zakaria, with a R-23 missile from an 11 km distance, shot down an Israeli BQM-34. When exiting the attack, the Syrian aircraft were intercepted by Israeli F-15A fighters, but the Syrians managed to escape from their pursuers. Later, the Syrian MiG-23MF carried out two more attacks of R-23 missiles on Israeli UAVs, but on these two times they were not successful.
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On June 7, a Syrian MiG-23MF (piloted by Merza) attacked a group of Israeli F-16A fighters. The Syrian pilot fired two R-23 missiles, the first from nine kilometers, the second from seven kilometers and reported the downing of two F-16s. When exiting the attack, the Syrian aircraft was attacked by an Israeli fighter F-15A (piloted by Ofer Lapidot). The Israeli pilot fired an AIM-7F missile, but the Syrian aircraft dodged it, after which the Israeli approached close and released a Python-3 missile that hit the MiG, Merza catapulted and was rescued.
On June 8, another Syrian MiG-23MF (pilot by Hau) near Damur attacked a group of Israeli F-16As. From a distance of seven kilometers the Syrian pilot fired a R-23 missile and reported the downing of one F-16. Upon exiting the attack, the Syrian aircraft was attacked by a pair of Israeli F-15A fighters (pilots Shaul Simon and Dedi Rosenthal) who fired an AIM-7F missile and shot down a Syrian airplane, Hau ejected and was rescued.
On June 9, a pair of Syrian MiG-23MS (pilots by Tommy and Lt. Ali) attacked an Israeli F-4E. The Syrians fired R-3S and R-13M Air to Air missiles and reported the shooting down of the "Phantom". Upon exiting the attack, Syrian aircraft were attacked by Israeli F-15A fighters and themselves were shot down, the Syrian pilots ejected and were rescued.
On June 9, a Syrian MiG-23MF (piloted by Dibs) east of Beirut attacked a group of Israeli F-16A. From a distance of six kilometers, the Syrian pilot fired a R-23 missile and reported the downing of one F-16. Upon exiting the attack, the Syrian airplane was shot down, Dibs catapulted and was saved.
June 9, the Syrian MiG-23MF (pilot Nazah) attacked a group of Israeli F-16A. From a distance of five kilometers the Syrian pilot fired a R-23 missile and reported the downing of one F-16. Upon exiting the attack, the Syrian aircraft was shot down by Israeli fighters, Nazah was ejected and rescued.
On June 9, the Syrian MiG-23MF was shot down by Israeli fighters, the pilot Sophie was killed.
On June 9, the Syrian MiG-23MF was shot down by Israeli fighters, the pilot Yasin was killed.
On June 11, a pair of Syrian MiG-23MS (pilots to Mr. Abdul Heirat and Mr. Al-Zabi) near the lake Karun attacked the Israeli F-4E. The Syrians fired rockets R-3S and R-13M and reported the shooting down of the "Phantom". When exiting the attack, Syrian aircraft were attacked by the Israeli F-15A (pilot Mr. Joram Peled). The Israeli plane fired two AIM-7F missiles and shot down both MiGs, Syrian pilots ejected and were rescued.
In total, on this day, the Syrians shot down three F-4s, while losing two MiG-23MS and four MiG-21MF (the Israelis announced the destruction of at least 18 aircraft of various types of Syrian aircraft
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According to Soviet and Russian data, seven Israeli planes (five F-16s and two F-4s) and one BQM-34 unmanned aircraft were shot down during the Lebanon war in air battles with MiG-23MS and MiG-23MF fighters, with the loss of 10 of theirs. However, some circumstances do not allow convincingly to confirm the destruction of some Israeli planes (the loss of "BQM-34 " was confirmed by Israel), as follows from Babich's article "MiG-23MF in the Lebanon War", to the MiG-23MF pilots all five victories won were counted on the basis of their own reports ("According to the reports of the pilots, five enemy planes were shot down ..."). There is nothing known about the existence of documentary evidence of the declared victories in the form of debris of downed planes. There were no captured Israeli pilots by Syria. There were no airborne records confirming the declared victories, since no one from the MiG-23, whose pilots claimed about downed Israeli planes, returned to the base .
Syria also used MiG-23BN fighter-bombers. On June 9, the four Syrian MiG-23BN bombed the Israeli command center in Samakiyah. On June 11, a pair of Syrian MiG-23BN bombed the command post of Lieutenant Colonel Efroni - commander of the 362nd Battalion surrounded in Sultan-Yakub. The losses in the war in 1982 amounted to 14 MiG-23BN fighter-bombers.
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MiG-23s downed over Lebanon in 1982
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5th June 2017, a SyAAF MiG-23MLD (23-22B) carrying the serial 2797 operating from Dmeyr AB and piloted by Brig. General Kamil Ahmad Smita was shot down by insurgents and crashed in Tal Dakwa area (around 30km to the south east of Dmeyr AB).
A combination of screenshots from video footage posted on YouTube in in 2012 show a Syrian MiG-23 aircraft before and after the explosion of an alleged air to ground fire downing of the MiG-23 by Syrian rebels.
Syrian MiG-23MLD / MiG-23BN Floggers are used by the Syrian Air Force for ground attack, carrying bombs and unguided rockets.
The following pictures are of MiG-23MS from Egypt. A number of countries in the Middle East received an export version of the MiG-23S (Flogger-E) fighter, which is characterized by a smaller radar radome (presumably a less efficient Jay Bird radar is installed on the Flogger-E) and the absence of a laser rangefinder.
on the MiG-23C and by American intelligence it is comparable to a fighter radar F-4J Phantom (Pulse Doppler Radar AN / APG-59 - byakin). The MiG-23S fighter is equipped with a Sirena 3 radiation warning radar station (SPO-3 Sirena-3), whose antennas are located on the leading edges of the fixed parts of the wing, and a laser range finder located in front of the nose landing gear. The export version with smaller and worse performance Jay Bird radar (RP-22SM Sapphire-21 radar) and without a laser rangefinder received the designation Flogger-E (MiG-23MS). Most likely, this modification carries short-range air-to-air missiles AA-2 Atoll (P-3) instead of the standard set of AA-7 Apex (P-23) and AA-8 Aphid (P-60) missiles for Flogger-B.
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Meanwhile, one and a half to two dozen front-line fighters of the MiG-23MF / ML family are in service with the Syrian Air Force combat units, which can be upgraded to the multi-functional versions of the MiG-23-98-1 / 2/3, announced by OKB . Mikoyan, OJSC "Fazotron-NIIR", as well as GosNIIAS back in 1999. Despite the fact that the program to upgrade the “Floggers” to the MiG-23-98 level was frozen back in the early 2000s, its renewal as part of the “package” of military-technical support to the Syrian Arab army is a matter of short time.
As for the optional filling of this modernization program, it provided for the re-equipment of the standard MiG-23ML / MF with perspective on-board Moskit-23 radars based on waveguide-slot antenna arrays (instead of the early Sapphire-23ML / RP-23ML, presented by the Cassegrain antenna ) with increased energy potential of the transmission path, as well as hardware and software adaptation of the weapon control systems (SUV) of the MiG-23ML family of fighters to the use of modern medium-range guided air combat missiles RVV-AE ( P-77), equipped with active radar homing type 9B-1348E. The range of "capture" targets with an effective reflective surface (EPR / RCS) of the order of 1.5-2 square meters. (the F-16C multipurpose fighter with weapons at the nodes of the suspension) for this radar is about 70-75 km in an interference-free environment and 50-55 km in a more difficult jamming environment (when Turkish F-16C crews use EW AN / ALQ containers -131/165).
Nevertheless, the modernization “package” of the MiG-23-98 can also boast the ability to integrate into the avionics of a multi-range individual countermeasure capable of reducing the range of its “target capture” of
the “Fighting falcon” airborne radar AN / APG-68 (V) 9 from 95 up to 50-60 km, respectively. As a result, when using the more maneuverable (in comparison with the AMRAAM family) guided air combat missiles RVV-AE, equipped with lattice aerodynamic rudders (provide maneuvering up to 30-35G overloads), the MiG-23-98 could give a serious rebuff to the Turkish F-16C Block 50+ heading for the interception of the Syrian Su-24M.
No less significant advantage can be considered the possibility of integration into the element base of avionics of MiG-23-98-3 fighters of terminals of a two-way asynchronous data exchange line via a secure radio channel providing radio-correction of R-77 missiles (and their more advanced version RVV-SD / “Product 170 -1 ”) on all sections of the flight path, which, together with on-board terminals of the K-DlAE type, would provide the possibility of intercepting Turkish F-16Cs by target designation from Russian long-range radar aircraft barrage over Latakia and Idlib by the full detection and control of the A-50U, as well as multi-purpose fighters Su-35S with the "farsighted" radar N035 "Irbis-E". At the same time, this SUV operation mode would provide the Syrian MiG-23-98-3 pilots with the opportunity to “search and track” the Turkish F-16C without the need to activate their own airborne radars and subsequent rendezvous (for more stable tracking of Turkish fighters using electronic warfare systems) which would ultimately minimize the effectiveness of the retaliatory strike by Turkish AMRAAM.
Unfortunately, neither from the expert circles at the Russian defense ministry, nor from senior representatives of MiG RSK JSC and Fazotron-NIIR Corporation, there were no initiatives to provide the Syrian Air Force with such a “package” of military-technical support, and our a key Middle Eastern ally can use MiG-23ML fighters with huge modernization potential only as carriers of high-explosive fragmentation blanks for delivering attacks on Islamist formations in Idlib.
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The MiG-23 fleet was reinforced by some thirty examples in the past few years. Thirty-three MiG-23s, comprimising around thirty MiG-23MLDs and a few MiG-23UBs, were delivered by Belarus to Aleppo IAP/Neyrab airbase in 2008. While at first the intention of the deal was unclear, it soon appeared all were to be overhauled by ‘The Factory’, the SyAAF’s overhaul and maintenance facility at this airbase.
A Syrian Air Force major flying a Soviet-made fighter-bomber landed in Israel on October 11 1989 stunning Israeli officials who said the pilot had asked for political asylum.
Syria asserted that the MIG-23 plane had suffered mechanical problems and made an emergency landing, though the Syrian statement did not explain why the pilot had flown more than 50 miles into Israel.
Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin hastily left a Cabinet meeting as soon as he heard of the defection at about noon today. Joined by several other military officials, he rushed to the site of the landing, a small crop-duster air strip outside Megiddo in the central Galilee, and personally questioned the pilot.
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